Sunday 12 January 2014

Chomsky


"In 1969, he was in the Boston area on an extended business function. He therefore arranged a discussion with Chomsky. 


Chomsky had initially agreed to a one-hour meeting in his office. Ray brought only 3-4 pieces of evidence, including his work on CE 399, and a series of stills from the Zapruder film. 


Soon after the discussion began, Chomsky told “his secretary to cancel the remaining appointments for the day. 


The scheduled one-hour meeting stretched to 3-4 hours. 


Chomsky showed great interest in the material. We mutually agreed to a follow-up session later in the week. 


Then I met with Gar Alperovitz. At the end of our one-hour meeting, he said he would take an active part in the effort if Chomsky would lead it.” (Probe, Vol. 4 No. 2, p. 25) 


Ray’s second meeting with Chomsky lasted much of the afternoon. And “the discussion ranged beyond evidentiary items to other aspects of the case. I told Chomsky of Alperovitz’ offer to assist him if he decided to lead an effort to reopen. 


Chomsky indicated he was very interested, but would not decide before giving the matter much careful consideration.” (ibid) 


A professional colleague of Chomsky’s, Professor Selwyn Bromberger, was also at the second meeting. He drove Ray home. As he dropped him off he said, 


“If they are strong enough to kill the president, and strong enough to cover it up, then they are too strong to confront directly...if they feel sufficiently threatened, they may move to open totalitarian rule.” (ibid)


It is important to reflect on Bromberger’s words as Ray relates what happened next. He returned to California and again asked Chomsky to take up the cause. 


In April of 1969, Chomsky wrote back saying he now had to delay his decision until after a trip to England in June. He said he would get in touch with Ray then. 


Needless to say, he never did. 


He ended up being a prominent critic of the Vietnam War and this ended up making his name in both leftist and intellectual circles. 


Reflecting on Bromberger’s words to Marcus, one can conclude that Bromberger and Chomsky decided that the protest against Vietnam, which was becoming both vocal and widespread and almost mainstream at the time, afforded a path of less resistance than the JFK case did. After all, look at what had just happened to Jim Garrison. 


But if this is correct, it would qualify as a politically motivated decision. 


One not made on the evidence. 


As Marcus writes, it was with Chomsky, “not the question of whether or not there was a conspiracy—that he had given every indication of having already decided in the affirmative...” Marcus' revelations on this subject are informative and relevant in evaluating Chomsky, both then and now. It is interesting to know what Chomsky actually thought of the evidence when he was first exposed to it. This would seem to be a much more candid and open response than what he wrote decades later, when his writings on the subject were just as categorical, except the other way. 


In other words, Chomsky did a 180-degree flip on the issue of whether President Kennedy was killed by a conspiracy. 


And neither he nor Batey will inform you of that crucial fact. 


But it is in the record. "

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